

ists came to the conclusion that it is quite enough to install three automatic seismic stations on the territory of the Soviet Union. The more so that in your message, Mr. President, a possibility is envisaged of setting up automatic seismic stations on territories adjacent to the seismic zones in the Soviet Union—on the Hokkaido, in Pakistan and Afghanistan, naturally with the consent of respective governments.

The Soviet Government has named definite areas for the location of automatic seismic stations on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, Mr. President, taking into account your wishes we agree to relocate two stations to new places. We are entitled to expect therefore that your side also will name definite areas where such stations should be set up on the territory of the U.S. and that in reaching an agreement on the sites where stations are to be placed the American side will take into account our wishes.

Mr. President, we are convinced that all conditions exist now for reaching an agreement also on the question of inspection. It is known that at the recent time we heard not once from the Western side—agree in principle to inspection and then the road to agreement will be open. We believed and we continue to believe now that, in general, inspection is not necessary and if we give our consent to an annual quota of 2-3 inspections this is done solely for the purpose of removing the remaining differences for the sake of reaching agreement.

As you see we have made a serious step in your direction. The quota of inspections on the territory of each of the nuclear powers that we propose is sufficient. Indeed, in the negotiations your representatives themselves recognized that there is no need to verify all or a greater part of significant suspicious phenomena to restrain the states from attempts to violate the treaty. And they gave figures of annual inspections practically equalling the quota proposed by us. Naturally it is most reasonable to carry out inspection in seismic areas where the biggest number of unidentified seismic phenomena may occur. However if you consider it necessary we have no objection to inspection being carried out also in non-seismic areas provided such inspections are conducted within the annual quota indicated by us.

I noticed that in your reply you agree with the necessity of taking reasonable measures of precaution which would exclude a possibility of using inspection trips and visits to automatic seismic stations for the purpose of obtaining intelligence data. Of course, in carrying out on-site inspection there can be circumstances when in the area designated for inspection there will be some object of defense importance. Naturally, in such a case it will be necessary to take appropriate measures which would exclude a possibility to cause damage to the interests of security of the state on the territory of which inspection is carried out. In this respect I fully agree with the considerations expressed in your message.

Mr. President, in your message you suggest that our

representatives meet in New York or in Geneva for a brief preliminary consideration of some of the problems you touched upon. We have no objections to such meeting of our representatives. The Soviet Government for that purpose appointed N. T. Podorenko, U.S.S.R. Permanent Representative to the U.N., and S. K. Tsarapkin, U.S.S.R. Representative to the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, who could meet with your representative Mr. William C. Foster in New York on January 7-10. We proceed here from the assumption that meetings of our representatives should begin already in the very near future to agreement on questions still unsettled so that upon the re-opening of the 18-nation committee session our representatives could inform it that the road to the conclusion of an agreement banning all nuclear weapons tests is open.

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on NBC's "Today" Program

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk by Martin Agronsky and Hugh Downs presented in the "Cabinet Series" on the National Broadcasting Company's television program "Today" on January 21.

(Voice release 15 dated January 21)

Mr. Agronsky: Good morning, Hugh.

Mr. Secretary, have the prospects for peace been improved by the announcement last night that we made that Premier Khrushchev has agreed to two or three on-the-site inspections to promote the prospects for a nuclear test ban agreement?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think if we could look at it objectively we could agree that it is in the interests of both sides to try to turn down the spiraling arms race in the nuclear age. The frightful burdens and dangers of an unlimited arms race make this so.

Now, Mr. Khrushchev's acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection has at least opened the way to some serious discussion. So long as he was saying that the number was zero it was not possible to engage in serious discussions to discover whether a test ban is possible.

You see, the very simple element in disarmament, which is fundamental to us, is that the

¹ See p. 198.

of world—most of the nations of the world are on the side of the U.N. and the cause of freedom. I think this past year has shown a decrease in what has been called neutralism, because on that underlying issue there are only two forces, those who want the U.N. kind of world and those who are trying to tear it down. So I think there are many reasons for encouragement, but of course we always have unfinished business on our agenda.

Mr. Agranovsky: Would you say—it's a sweeping generalization. I'm afraid, but I'd like to ask the question—would you say that the chances for peace are better this year than they were last year?

Secretary Rusk: I think the chances are somewhat better, Martin. And the Secretary of State is always reluctant to be too optimistic, but I think they are better because I think in 1962 the world has seen peace hang by a very slender thread that was drawn tautly. And I think the world has had a chance to see and think specifically and realistically about the consequences if that thread should break. I think that has infused a note of sobriety and caution in dealing with great and dangerous issues, which itself is an encouraging sign of prospects for peace.

The Cuban Crisis

Mr. Agranovsky: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could address ourselves to some personal, and I think extraordinary, dramatic aspects of that moment when, as you say, the thread might have been broken. I think we all accept this fact that at the climactic point of the Cuban crisis our country stood on the brink of war. I wonder if you could look back at those dangerous moments and tell us something about the human aspects of it, your own feelings, those of the President. It would not be a violation of your privileged conversations with the President.

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are many aspects of that moment in October when things were so tightly drawn and so dangerous that one can never forget. I will never forget, for example, the calm and the sobriety with which President Kennedy handled that matter.¹ Indeed, I think he was the calmest man in town

during that period, despite the fact that he was carrying that awesome and lonely ultimate responsibility.

But I think also it illustrated the great difficulty of bridging this great gap of ideology between the Soviet bloc and the free world, to get words to mean the same thing to each other, to establish credibility, because, had the Soviet side read and thought about and believed what the President had said in his press conferences in September, this crisis might not have developed in the way that it did.

I think it illustrated the utmost importance of the unity of the alliances. I think the fact that the OAS and the NATO allies rallied unanimously, immediately, in that situation, was itself a very great contribution to peace, because this must have made an important impression in Moscow. But I think also that one would have to say that it is important that we work at these vital issues, that defense of vital issues by peaceful means in a nuclear world is the greatest responsibility the statesmen have these days, and I think that we all have come away from that experience encouraged but sober and determined to keep at it.

Communist Unity on Fundamental Issues

Mr. Agranovsky: Mr. Secretary, the foreign policy of the President and yourself actually matters tremendously in determining the fate of our country and the free world, but there are great historic changes which we haven't brought about and yet which had an enormous effect on us. For example, the split between Russia and Communist China, which has been demonstrated so vividly and so dramatically in this Communist Congress meeting in East Berlin. I wonder, sir—it's something that all of us are wondering about—how would you define the meaning of the split in two senses, in the Communist world and to ourselves?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't want to appear as an expert on that split because I'm not sure that either Moscow or Peking fully understands the nature of the split or the relationships between the two parts of the Communist

¹ For President Kennedy's address to the Nation on the Soviet threat to the Americas, see *ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 715.

tail on that because Chancellor Adenauer and he are meeting today. The five, the other members of the Six^{*} are meeting with the United Kingdom today. The talks will be resumed on January 28th.

But this present episode of discussion and difference of view, frankly, will not change—in my judgment will not change one elementary fact, and that is that Europe and the North Atlantic are and must be moving toward growing unity and growing strength because the elementary facts of the present world situation make it necessary, and this has been the entire course of development since 1945.

Now, the reconciliation between Germany and France is a matter of greatest historical importance. It will be a great thing in history for us to be able to say, after several hundred years, that world wars will not start because of differences within the Western European community. This is a great thing. But it is also a great thing to see that that cooperation is within the framework of a unified Europe and an increasingly intimate North Atlantic community which itself has a network of special relationships with nations in all parts of the world, because here lies the prospect for the eventual success of the free world and the safety of the free world against any threats from the outside.

Mr. Agronsky: Well, you feel then, sir, that President de Gaulle's stubbornness and pride in this instance, both in insisting on developing an independent nuclear force for France and in his resistance to British entry into the Common Market, is not a major division in our grand alliance?

Secretary Rusk: No, I think that the Common Market discussions do represent a very serious difference and that it would be important for us to find the right answers to that. We have ourselves stayed out of those negotiations, despite the fact that we have a great interest in the result, because these are matters—the Common Market arrangements are matters which intimately affect the daily lives of every citizen in the countries involved. And

these are primarily matters for him to work out on the other side.

But on the NATO multilateral force matter, when President de Gaulle said that he did not expect that France would participate, that does not mean that the NATO multilateral force will not go forward, and promptly, with those members of the alliance who wish to go forward with it.

Mr. Agronsky: And it will be effective without France?

Secretary Rusk: And will be effective without France.

Peace in Caribbean Depends on Cuban Behavior

Mr. Agronsky: You are reported, sir, to have told a closed-door meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that there no longer exists even a possibility of a U.S. no-invasion pledge on Cuba. And you said the reason was the obvious one, that we have not gotten agreement for on-the-site inspection in Cuba to verify Soviet missile removal.

Now, Mr. Secretary, do such missiles still exist in Cuba, as some members of the U.S. Senate seem to think they do? And does our withholding of this no-invasion pledge mean that we contemplate some day having to invade Cuba?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the President said in his November 20th press conference that we are confident that the missiles which we knew were there have been removed.⁶ Now, in this world it is impossible to give 100 percent, absolute assurance on a matter of that sort unless there is effective on-site inspection and detailed examination of the island, because it's a problem of proving the negative.

But I think on the question of the so-called—of the no-invasion pledge, I remind you that the Soviet Union and the United States had a series of talks over the last 2 months at the United Nations. They were not able to agree, as they reported to the Secretary-General, on all the points at issue, although they reported that some progress had been made.⁷

^{*}The six members of the European Common Market are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

⁶BULLETIN of Dec. 10, 1962, p. 874.

⁷For text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. letter to Secretary-General U Thant, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1963, p. 153.

Now, the situation on that point is relatively simple. It was not the purpose or the intention of the United States to invade Cuba, with the enormous loss of life that would incur, except in defense of the hemisphere, except on a major security issue which required it. The introduction of offensive missiles was such a threat. The basic treaty arrangements of the hemisphere continue intact, the Rio Treaty and the rest of them.

Now, the question of peace in the Caribbean is largely a question of the behavior of Cuba. The President has said that, if Cuba does not become a base for aggression, he will not initiate or permit aggression in the Caribbean.⁶ But this also means, as he said, that we will not abandon other measures directed to insuring that Cuba not be a source of infection for the rest of the hemisphere.

The attitude of the rest of the hemisphere, expressed at Punta del Este,⁷ is that the invasion of this hemisphere by a Marxist-Leninist regime is unacceptable to the hemisphere.

Mr. Agronsky: Then our feeling is that there are other methods or alternatives of force to getting Castroism and Marxism and Leninism out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are other measures that are used and will be used. For example, there has been a very sharp reduction in shipping and trade between the free world and Cuba.

Mr. Agronsky: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I wish we could go on examining the state of the world. It has been a fascinating experience to hear your observations, sir.